I. INTRODUCTION

A. Motivation
Congestion control protocols have been modelled as distributed algorithms for utility maximization, e.g., [9] , [13] , [ZOj, [2X] , [lo] . [12j. With the exception of a few limited analysis on very simple topologies [19] , [Ill, [12] , existing literature generally assumes that all sources are homogeneous in that, even though they may control their rates using different algorithms, they all adapt to the same type of congestion signals, e.g., all react to loss probabilities, as in TCP Reno, or all to queueing delay, as in TCP Vegas or FAST [SI. When sources with heterogeneous protocols that react to different congestion signals share the same network, the current duality framework is no longer applicable. .With more congestion control protocols being proposed and ideas of using congestion signals other than packet losses, including explicit feedbacks, being developed in the networking community. we need a mathematically rigorous framework to understand the behavior of large-scale networks with heterogeneous protocols. The purpose of this paper is to propose such a framework.
Our emphasis is on general networks with multiple sources and links that use a large class of algorithms to adapt their rates and congestion prices. Often. interesting and counterintuitive behaviors arise only in a network setting where sources interact through shared links in intricate and surprising ways, e.g., [26] . Such behaviors are absent in single-link models and are usually hard to discover or explain without a fundamental understanding of the underlying structure. Given the scale and heterogeneity of the Internet, it is conceivable that such behaviors are more common than we realize, but remain difficult to measure due to the complexity of the infrastructure and our inability to monitor it closely. A mathematical framework thus becomes indispensable in exploring structures. clarifying ideas, and suggesting directions. Some of the theoreticaI predictions in this paper have aIready been demonstrated experimentally in [25].
B. Samma?
A congestion control protocol generally takes the form Here, L ( j ) denotes the set o f links used by source j, and g ( . ) models a queue management algorithm that updates the price p l ( t ) at link 1, often implicitly, based on its current value and the sum of source rates sj(t) that traverse link E. The prices may represent loss probabilities, queueing delays, or quantities explicitly calculated by the links and fed back to the sources.
The function f j ( . ) models a TCP algorithm that adjusts the transmission rate xj(t) of source j based on its current value and the sum of "effective prices" m ! ( p l ( t ) ) in its path. The effective prices mj ( p l ( t ) ) are functions of the link prices pl(t). and the functions m: in general can vary depending on the links and sources.
When all algorithms use the same pricing signal, i.e., mj = ml are the same for all sources j , the equilibrium properties of (1)42) turn out to be very simple. Indeed, under mild conditions on st(.) and fj(.), the'equifibrium of (1)-(2) exists and is unique [121. This is proved by identifying the equilibrium of ( l t ( 2 ) with the unique solution of the utility maximization problem defined in [9] and its Lagrange dual problem [13] . Here, the equilibrium prices pl play the role of Lagrange multipliers, one at each link. This utility maximization problem thus provides a simple and complete characterization of the equilibrium of a single-protocol network.
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When heterogeneous algorithms that use different pricing signals share the same network, Le., mi are different for different sources j . the situation is much more complicated. For instance, when TCP Reno and TCP Vegas or FAST share the same network, neither loss probability nor queueing delay can serve as the Lagrange multiplier at the link, and (1)-(2) can no longer be interpreted as solving the standard utility maximization problem. Basic questions, such as the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium, its local and global stability, need to be re-examined.
In the multi-protocol case, we prove that equilibrium still exists, under mild conditions, despite the lack of an underlying concave optimization problem (Section 111). In contrast to the single-protocol case, even when the routing matrix has full row rank, there can be uncountably many equilibria (Example 1 in Section IV) and the set of bottleneck links can be nonunique (Example 2 in Section IV). However, we prove that almost all networks have finitely many equilibria and they are necessarily locally unique (Section IV). Non-uniqueness can arise in two ways. First, the equilibria associated with different sets of bottleneck links are always distinct. Second, the number of equilibria associated with each set of bottleneck links can be more than one, though always odd (Section IV). Moreover, these equilibria cannot all be locally stable unless the equilibrium is globally unique (Section V). Finally, we provide three additional sufficient conditions for global uniqueness of network equilibrium (Section V), The first condition generalizes the full-rank condition on R for global uniqueness from single-protocol networks to multi-protocol networks. The second condition guarantees global uniqueness when the price mapping functions mi = mj are linear and link-independent. The last condition implies global uniqueness of a class of linear networh. Throughout the paper, we provide numerical examples to illustrate equilibrium properties or how a theorem can be applied. In 1251, we demonstrate experimentally the phenomenon of multiple equiIit'ria using TCP Reno and TCP VegasFAST io ns-2 simulatormummynet testbed.
Our formulation is close to the general equilibrium theory [171 in economics from which we borrow some ideas and techniques. See [41, 161, [71, I221, 1231 Source ( j , i ) has a utility function Lri(zi) that is strictly concaveincreasing in i t s r a t e 4 , k t U = (U:: i = 1,. . . , N j , j = 1:. . . , J ) .
In general, if z k is defined, then 3 denotes the (column) vector z = (zk, V k ) , Other notations will be introduced later when they are encountered. We call (c, m, R! U ) a network. 
B. Nenvork equilibrium
In equilibrium, the aggregate rate at each link is no more than the link capacity, and they are equal if the link price is strictly positive. Formally, we call p an equilibrium price, a network equilibriiim. or just an equilibrium if it satisfies (from (3145))
where P is a diagonal matrix defined as P := ha&). The goal of this paper is to study the existence and uniqueness properties of network equilibrium specified by (3) -(6) . Let E be the equilibrium set:
For future use, we now define an active constraint set and the Jacobian for links that are actively constrained. Fix an equilibrium price p* E E. Let In this subsection, we briefly review the current theory for the case where there is only one protocol, i.e., J = 1, and explain why it cannot be directly applied to the case of heterogeneous protocols.
When all sources react to the same price. then the equilibrium described by (3)- (6) where we have omitted the superscript j = 1. The strict concavity of Ui guarantees the existence and uniqueness of the optimal solution of (11)-(12). The basic idea to relate the utility maximization problem (1 1)-(12) to the equilibrium equations (3)-(6) is to examine the dual of the utility maximization problem, and interpret the effective price ml(p1) as a Lagrange multiplier associated with each link capacity constraint (see, e.g., [131, [201. [121) . 
Therefore, we get a link with p i > 0 but not fully utilized. It 0 contradicts the equilibrium condition (6).
The following theorem asserts the existence of equilibrium for a multi-protocol network. 
R, U ) .
For any link 1, let
Then we may write F ( p ) as F ( p l , p -l ) . Define function hl as
We claim that h l ( p l , p -l ) is a quasi-concave function in p1 for any fixed p-t. By the definition of quasi-concavity in [21], we only need to check that the set
When a 5 0, the set Al can be rewritten as
Since &(p*) < 0 and we can take p; = 0. These conditions imply (6), and hence p* is an equilibrium price.
Moreover, the proof of Lemma 1 shows that f i ( p m a x , p l l ) . , < 0. Therefore, there exists a point p ; in [O,p&] where.F(pl,pS,) = 0. This pf = pg for k # 1 is also a Nash equiIibrium that maximizes Thus we have proved that, for
Theorem 2 guarantees the existence of network equilibrium. We now study its uniqueness properties.
In a single-protocol network, if the routing matrix R has full row rank. then there is a unique active constraint set i and a unique equilibrium price p associated with it [20] . If R does not have full row rank, then equilibrium prices p may he nonunique but the equilibrium rates a(p) are still unique since the utility functions are strictly concave, This also implies that the set of links 1 with yl(p) = cl is the same for any equilibrium price p , though the active constraint sets where pr > 0 may not be unique.
In contrast, the active constraint set in a multi-protocol network can be non-unique even if R has fuH row rank.
Clearly, the equilibrium prices associated with different active constraint sets are different. Moreover, there can be multiple equilibrium prices associated with the same active constraint set, as we prove below. 
Then the equilibrium rates z j of type j sources are determined by the equilibrium prices p as
where 1 is a vector of appropriate dimension whose entries are all Is. We use linear price mapping functions: corresponding routing matrices
The linear mapping functions are given by
It is easy to calculate that The corresponding rates are
All capacity constraints are tight with these rates. Since there is an one-link flow at every link, the active constraint set is unique and contains every link. Yet there are uncountably many equilibria.
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Example 2: multiple active constraint sets each with a unique equilibrium Consider the symmetric network in Figure 2 with 3 flows. There are two protocols in the network with the following routing matrices
Flows (1,l) and (1,2) have identical utility function U1 and source rate d, and flow ( 2 , l ) has a utility function U 2 and source rate 2. 3) for 1 = I, 2, mT(pl) p2 as pr + j+. and sari@
Proof: We first claim that, if cl < q and (V2)f(2cl -cg) > 2m:( (U1)'(c2 -c l ) ) , then there is an equilibrium point where only links 1 and 3 are saturated and link 2 is not. In this case the equilibrium price for link 2 is p2 = 0 and, by symmetry, those for links 1 and 3 are both p l . Such an equilibrium, if exists, is defined by the following equations:
Eliminating x 2 and p1, the above equations are reduced to: [(uy'[o) )
The inequality and the last equality have made multiple use of conditions 2 and 3 of the theorem. On the other hand, when
by condition 3. Since all functions here are continuous, (Uj)' are strictly decreasing, and ni? are strictly increasing, there exists a unique 0 < Z* < c2 -c1 such that (!?)'(cl -x * ) = We next claim that, if c2 < 2cl and (U2)'(2cl -c2) < m ; ( ( U 1 ) ' ( c z -c l ) ) , then there is an equilibrium point where only link 2 is saturated and links 1 and 3 are not. In this case p1 = p3 = 0, and the following equations determine such an equilibrium:
Eliminating x2 and p z , the equilibrium is specified by The resulting 4 and , 6: for all flows ( j , i) are shown in Table   I . We further check the local stability of these three equilibria under the gradient algorithm (23) to be introduced in Section IV-C. The eigenvalues and index for each equilibrium are shown in Table 11 
where A > 0 is an L x L diagonal matrix whose elements represent stepsizes. A source updates its rate based on the end-to-end price
A consequence of assumption A3 is that p(t) 2 p , i , > 0 for all t under the gradient algorithm (21)- (22). This guarantees a unique active constraint set that is L.. Hence the equilibrium set
Combining (21)- (22) with y(p(i)) = Rz(t) yields the required vector field U: 1) If p l ( t ) = pmaX, link 1 will be underutilized, yla(p(t)) < 2) If p l ( t ) = pml,, the aggregate rate at link 1 will exceed Therefore, every point p on the boundary of G will move inward. Hence our result directly follows from the PoincareHopf index theorem.
[3 CL. and I j l < 0 according to (23).
q , y l ( p ( t ) ) > cl, and 7;1 > 0 according to (23).
v. SUFFICIENT CONDITIONS FOR GLOBAL UNIQUENESS
The exact condition under which network equilibrium is globally unique is generally hard to prove. This section provides four sufficient conditions for global uniqueness. The first condition relates Iocal stability of the equilibria to their uniqueness. The second condition generalizes the full rank condition of R from single-protocol network to multi-protocol network. The third condition guarantees uniqueness when the price mapping functions are linear and link-independent. The final condition implies global uniqueness of linear networks.
A . First condition: local stability and global iiniqueness
Recall that under assumption A3, we can assume without loss of generality that L, is the unique active constraint set that contains all links. We say an equilibrium y* E E /ocuZ/y sruble if the corresponding Jacobian matrix J(y') defined in (8) is stable, that is. every eigenvalue of J(p*) = a~( p * ) / a p has negative real part. Hence a locally stable y* is also locally unique, but the converse may not hold. To justify this definition. take the matrix h in the gradient algorithm (23) to be A I . Then the linearized system is ( 6 p denotes the perturbation around p*):
Since X > 0 is a scalar. the real part of the eigenvalues of AJ(p*) has the same sign as that of the eigenvalues of J(p*).
Hence the local asymptotic stability of p* implies that the gradient algorithm (23) converges locally to p*. 
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This result may seem surprising on the first sight as it relates the local stability of an algorithm to the uniqueness property of a network. This is because both equilibrium and local stability are defined in terms of the function y(p): an equilibrium p* satisfies y(p*) = c and the local asymptotic stability of p* is determined by ay(p')/ap. The connection between these two properties is made exact by the index theorem. An implication of this result is that if there are multiple equilibria, then no algorithm p = f(p(t)), whose linearization around each equilibrium p* E E satisfies 6'f(p*)/ap = ay(p*)/@, can ever be found to locally stabilize all of the equilibria.
Conversely, if we can find a region that contains E and such an algorithm such that i) all boundary points of that region move inwards, and ii) the algorithm locally stabilizes any equilibrium then there is exactly one network equilibrium. Local stability can be checked in several ways. For example, if the Jacobian matrix is diagonal dominant at an equilibrium, then the equilibrium is locally stable. This test of local stability will be used in Theorem 11 below.
B. Second conditiopl: negative dejrziteriess of J{p)
In a single-protocol network, for the equilibrium price to be unique, it is sufficient that the routing matrix R has full row rank. Otherwise, only the source rates are unique, not necessarily the link prices. In a multi-protocol network, this is no longer sufficient. We now provide another sufficient condition that plays the same role in a multi-protocol network as the rank condition on R does in a single-protocol network (see also the remark after the proof of Theorem 9). In the single-protocol case, a similar result has been obtained in [20] . However, for that case, the Jacobian matrix is negative definite when R has full row rank. Then the condition in Theorem 9 always holds and the equilibrium is unique. In the multi-protocol case. the Jacobian matrix is in general not symmetric and hence not negative definite. Therefore R having full row rank is no longer sufficient for the condition in the theorem to hold.
Since we do not know the equilibrium set E , the condition in the theorem cannot be directly applied to prove global This contradiction proves the theorem.
uniqueness. To use the theorem, however, it is sufficient to find a convex superset E of E a n ! a superset V of V ( E ) 
Then there exists at least one j such that 4 := (RjlTv is nonzero. Without lose of generality, assume it is j = 1. Then Theorem 11. Suppose assumptions Al-A2 hold. The linear nerwork in Figure 5 has a unique equilibrium.
Proof. Take h = 1 in the gradient algorithm (23). We will prove that all the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix have negative real part for all p 2 0. This implies that all equilibria are locally stable. By Theorem 7 there must be a unique equilibrium.
In the network shown in Figure 5, The network topology is shown in Figure 6 with link capacities 
